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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of metaphoric language on judgment, assessment 
and juror verdict decision making. It further examines potential interactions between the 
use of figurative language and defendant race on juror verdict decisions. Research has 
potential implications on how the recent cultural climate has changed racial biases 
within the realm of juror decision making. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
The United States Jury is a powerful entity that makes collaborative decisions 
regarding the fate of many involved in the American Justice System. The multiple citizen 
jury is designed to produce a more precise and just judgment than a single judge. (Tindale 
& Davis, 1983; Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983). An abundance of literature 
supports the concept of the citizen jury; such research shows that judgments made by 
groups are more accurate and less biased than those made by individuals. (Tindale & 
Kluwe, in press; Larrick & Soll, 2006; Devine, 2012; Stawiski, Dykema-Engblade, & 
Tindale, 2012). This project investigates the biases jurors carry into deliberation and how 
those biases can be influenced by certain types of language. 
Racial biases are not a new concept to be studied in psychological literature. 
Many researchers have attempted to examine how implicit associations regarding 
particular prejudices affect behavior (Allport, 1954; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Ma & Correll, 
2010). In recent years, racial prejudice looks a little different; the form of racism has 
changed (Dovidio, 2001; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder 
& Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2003; Bothwell et al. 2006). Racism 
in contemporary American society involves a disinclination among Caucasians to engage 
in obvious acts of discrimination against African Americans. When discrimination 
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against blacks occurs, whites attempt to justify it on grounds other than just race 
(Bothwell et al. 2006). There is no apparent evidence of this phenomenon existing in the 
reverse. This project furthers understanding of the biases engaged in verdict assignments 
for individuals of African American and Caucasian descent when controlled for crime. 
Another goal of this project was to examine the processes that underlie individual 
juror’s verdict assignments considering the cognitive narrative that they possess as the 
product of case presentation. Figurative language, specifically metaphoric in nature, is 
instrumental in framing arguments and providing highly descriptive language which is, in 
turn, persuasive. Metaphors are an effective communication strategy that creates less 
verbose, yet more vivid and memorable statements. Research done by Grasser and 
colleagues (1989) found that people use metaphors rather frequently: approximately once 
every 25 words. Recently, metaphoric language has been used to further understand how 
people represent crime in general (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). An example is the 
colloquialisms used in politics, “war on drugs,” “get tough on crime” or “crime as a 
disease.” Politicians use such phrases to describe crime and produce policies to address 
related concerns. 
There are a multitude of methods that have been used in literature regarding the 
biases found in the decision making process of juries and individual jurors (Devine, 
2012). The story model serves as a tool to reveal the cognitive processes that underlie the 
computation of evidence and case presentations into a final verdict decision. The story 
model allows jurors to recreate a cognitive narrative that can be studied. The idea is that 
jurors choose a verdict that most closely aligns with their respective cognitive narrative. 
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The deliberation of a jury then serves as an attempt to synthesize the cognitive narratives 
of all jurors into a single narrative that allows the group to assign a befitting verdict 
(Devine, 2012). Although not much empirical evidence can be found in the recent 
research, the story model can be used to examine many of the biases that juries and 
individual jurors possess. The present study uses the method of the story model, however, 
we use a similar coding method. 
Metaphor and Cognition 
Metaphoric language consists of three basic components: the topic or subject of 
the metaphor, the vehicle that the subject is being compared to, and the ground or implied 
topic. (Grasser, Long & Mio, 1989). However, some literature breaks metaphoric 
language down into two parts; the topic of the metaphor and the “vehicle.” The topic is 
called the target or the specific subject of the metaphor. The “vehicle” or “source” is the 
concept or object that the target is being likened to. (Lakoff, 1993; Richards, 1936; Ottati, 
Renstrom, & Price, 2014). 
The Metaphoric Framing model was constructed to describe the effects of 
metaphoric language. The model has two fundamental components; the activation and the 
application. The activation of the metaphor is the first stage where the metaphor 
“activates,” this begins with priming of the vehicle. The activation is simply when the 
vehicle or source is primed. The application is when the vehicle is applied and linked to 
the target; for example, activating a stereotype (such as “disease”), to a specific subject 
(such as “crime”). An example is the suggestion that a “criminal is a beast” or the 
“officer is a bully.” These types of statements are descriptions of a “root metaphor.” 
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Subsequent phrases may draw on the root metaphor. Many times, metaphors imply a 
story or specific stereotype. For example, “bully” implies that there is a victim or target 
of the ‘bullying.’ The root metaphor applies the ‘bully’ script to the target, the officer. 
The second stage of the Metaphoric Framing Model is the application of the metaphor. 
This step involves drawing upon the implications regarding the root metaphor. “Officer is 
a bully” implies indirectly that the victim of such a bully needs to be rescued. 
The linking of the target to the vehicle (application) can be done explicitly as 
well; phrases may be added to go on to describe the officer using verbiage that links to 
the stereotype, such as “[the officer] taunted the defendant” (Ottati, Renstrom, & Price, 
2014). Incidental activation of the metaphor may occur when two schemas are presented 
and the viewer/reader spontaneously links the two. For example, an individual watching 
the news may view multiple breaking developments in a short amount of time. One story 
might discuss the most recent terrorist attack, and the next news story may be about a 
recent outbreak of E.coli. The metaphor, “terrorism is a disease” may be instantaneously 
activated. Some metaphoric phrases are used so regularly that they become chronically 
accessible and have automatic activation in the mind. 
Current media regarding alleged police discrimination of African Americans 
frequently uses metaphorically charged words and phrases such as “bully.” Such phrases 
imply that the ‘bully’ must be stopped and that they are causing others to feel 
uncomfortable or threatened in some way. Metaphoric phrases allow information to be 
implied and other missing information may be “filled in” when there are holes in the 
story (Ottati, Renstrom, & Price, 2014). 
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In case presentation, jurors who are given this metaphoric and affectively charged 
information are more likely to be persuaded into feelings that the “bully” must not win. 
They are, therefore, more prone to feel sympathy for the “victim” defendant and find 
him “not guilty.” A similar outcome is expected if a defendant is described as a “beast.” 
Such a phrase implies that the defendant is a “wild animal” which must be tamed or 
restrained in some way. The effect would presumably be most prevalent in cases where 
jurors have little contrary evidence or little evidence at all. The effect would strongly 
influence jurors who have been previously exposed to information that is consistent with 
the metaphor (Hansen, 2007). 
Thus far, research on figurative language has not been studied in conjunction with 
individual jurors or deliberating juries. Because metaphors directly affect the mental 
representation of biases, the use of metaphoric language is appropriate to use in my 
examination of the development of biases that influence a particular verdict. 
Race 
Metaphor-Race Congruence hypothesis predicts that the metaphor assimilation 
effectise especially strong when the defendant’s race is compatible with the metaphor. 
That is, the “beast” or “animal” metaphor should elicit especially severe ratings of guilt 
when the defendant is African American. This is because African Americans and 
animals are stereotyped as possessing congruent attributes (e.g., dangerous, violent). 
However, this assimilation effect is more likely to occur when there is a subtle 
metaphoric prime. Assimilation is the process by which the viewer/reader accepts the 
metaphoric content as true.  Subjects may view explicit metaphoric primes as offensive 
6 
and thus they may attempt to correct (maybe even overcorrect) for such—which is 
referred to as a contrast effect (Ottati 2012). 
The current state of the social and political climate is highly in tune with the topic 
of police brutality. Recent events such as the State of Missouri v. Darren Wilson 
regarding the shooting of Michael Brown highlights the current social sensitivity to the 
idea that people (particularly African Americans) are subject to being victims of 
“bullying” in the criminal justice system.  The prevalence of news stories featuring a 
black victim and a white police officer as a “bully” have occurred such high frequency 
that the linkage of “police” and “bully” is chronically accessible to the public. Similarly, 
there have been numerous instances where racism became a main topic of conversation in 
the media and, consequently, trickled into the justice system. These recent events have 
made salient the role of African Americans as victims of police bullying. This makes the 
metaphor-congruence equally applicable for the “bullied” or “victim” metaphor for 
African Americans in a legal setting. Aside from the political discord surrounding these 
cases, the topic of racism is historically controversial in American culture. 
Story Model 
Pennington and Hastie (1986; 1993) were the first researchers to propose the use 
of the Story Model in jury research. The goal of the model is to uncover the cognitive 
processes that jurors use to synthesize the evidence presented and the case presentations 
from both sides. Presumably, jurors is then proceed to choose a verdict that is most 
congruent with their reported cognitive narrative (Devine, 2012). 
7 
Jurors do not limit their interpretation of a case to strictly the information that is 
presented. During the usual course of a jury trial, case presentation is broken up by 
testimony and witness examination. Jurors are motivated to understand the case as much 
as possible because they are reminded several times by attorneys and judges on the 
importance of their role. As active information processors, they engage in an intensive 
cognitive process as information is presented. Jurors rely on previous knowledge to fill 
in gaps of missing information as consequence of the segmented nature of trial 
presentation. The previous knowledge and experience that individual jurors bring into a 
jury carry respective individual bias and prejudice. The story model relies on these 
assumptions. 
The hypothesis is that jurors are able to accurately recreate their cognitive process 
in such a way that it reflects the actual information process they experienced while 
interpreting the evidence of the case. Jurors then choose a verdict that is most aligned 
with their cognitive “story.” Furthermore, the theory asserts that the better a story 
matches the criteria for a specific verdict, the more confident that a juror feels in their 
verdict decision. 
The current research was interested in the juror’s recall of metaphoric statements 
or innuendoes. Do jurors recall the metaphoric “vehicle?” Do jurors use any similar 
words or phrases which may be metaphorically linked or similar to the vehicle used in the 
story? If so, it would imply a strong effect of the metaphoric content. One general 
question this research hoped to address is whether metaphoric language has an influential 
impact on jury verdict assignments.  Also, we were interested to find out whether or not 
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this effect is influenced by the race of the defendant or of the individual jurors. Although 
this study does not test the coherence of the story narrative, this can be explored in future 
research on the effect of metaphoric language on the story model. 
CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW 
Research 
Participants occupied the role of jurors who examined trial evidence in the form 
of a trial transcript regarding an alleged carjacking. The defendant’s race was briefly 
mentioned prior to the case presentation and it was randomly generated to be either 
African American or Caucasian. Metaphoric content was also manipulated. In one 
condition, statements were inserted into the defense’s trial presentation that implied the 
defendant was the “victim of bullying” (officer bullying metaphor) while implying that 
the system, or arresting officer, bullied him. In another condition, statements were 
inserted into the prosecution's case that imply a “beast” (animal) metaphor to describe the 
defendant. We investigated our hypotheses by presenting participants with two sets of 
arguments; one set was the prosecution’s arguments and the other was the defense’s 
arguments. We examined the effect of metaphoric utterances by (a) inserting or omitting 
the “beast” metaphor into the prosecution argument, and (b) inserting or omitting the 
“bully” metaphor into the defense argument. 
Participants then wrote a short story describing what they thought happened in the 
case. This was how we tested whether or not participants recalled the metaphoric content. 
Participants were asked to give their verdict, “guilty” or “not guilty”, then to give a rating 
of their confidence level on a scale of 1-10 (ten being most confident). We refer to this 
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rating as the “Probability of guilt rating.” Subjects then rated the arguments of both the 
prosecution and the defense for “effectiveness.” We predicted that participants would 
recreate metaphoric content in their case narrative more often when they gave a higher 
confidence rating in their verdict. 
Hypothesis 
Our central hypothesis predicted an effect of metaphoric language on verdict 
assignment and confidence in that verdict. We predicted a greater amount of guilt in the 
“metaphor in prosecution argument” (“beast”) condition and a greater amount of “not 
guilty” verdicts in the “metaphors in defense argument” (“bully”) condition. We expected 
a higher number of “guilty” verdicts in conditions where the “beast” metaphor was used 
to describe a black defendant. However, we expected some participants to correct for the 
bias this metaphoric content presented. Consequently, we predicted a higher rate of “not 
guilty” verdicts in conditions where the bully metaphor was used in accordance with a 
black defendant. 
CHAPTER THREE 
METHODS 
Participation 
The surveys were taken online by introductory psychology students who received 
course credit for their participation. We collected responses from 194 subjects. 
Participants mean age was 19 years. The population we used consisted of 29% males and 
71% females. The sample contained 52.5% of participants who identified as Caucasian, 
and 3% who identified as African American. The second largest (16.5%) racial group 
identified as Asian. 
Design 
The present study was designed as a 2 (defendant race) by 2 (presence or absence 
of pro-prosecution metaphor (“beast” metaphor) or pro-defense metaphor (“officer was a 
bully”)) by 2 (presence or absence of a defense metaphor (“bully metaphor”)) 
experiment. 
Participants were recruited through an online recruiting system where 
participants were able to select which cases they participate in. Participants who selected 
the “Juror decision making” study were told they would read a hypothetical case about a 
carjacking. The entire study was conducted online and participants were awarded one 
point of class credit for completing the study. 
11 
12 
The case was written in the format of a case transcript that mimics what attorneys 
might actually say during a trial regarding a carjacking. Both defense and prosecution 
stories were written as to provide a coherent story, but it should be unclear which verdict 
is most appropriate given the facts. The facts of the case remain constant among all 
conditions. Metaphoric content was added to the prosecution or defenses case in order to 
bolster the arguments of each side. 
There were four content conditions; no metaphoric language, metaphoric 
language in only the prosecution’s case (the “beast” metaphor), metaphoric language in 
only the defense’s case (the “bully” metaphor), and metaphoric language in both the 
prosecution and defense arguments. Race was randomly generated in each case for a total 
of eight conditions. 
The officer and the other characters in the case had racially neutral names (neither 
black nor white. i.e. Rogers, Tabor and Worthy) to disassociate them with traditional 
racial stereotypes. The control conditions had either both metaphors or no metaphorical 
content. 
We predicted the manipulation of metaphoric language in case presentation and 
the defendant race manipulation would cause an effect on juror judgments of case 
presentation (found in the story model), verdict assignments, reported probability of guilt, 
and recreation of metaphoric words or phrases. 
Materials 
This study was conducted using an online survey method. The survey was created 
on Qualtrics, an online survey software. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
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eight conditions. All participants read a trial transcript describing a carjacking case (see 
appendix). The prosecution claims the defendant hit the victim in a parking garage in 
order to take his car. The defense claims the defendant was never in the parking garage, 
but was incidentally driving the car that was stolen by another person. 
Some participants received metaphoric content in the defense’s case, some in the 
prosecution’s case, some in both the prosecution’s and defense’s cases (control), and 
some in neither case (control). Defendant race was randomly assigned within conditions. 
Conditions were randomly assigned by the survey software and the software ensured that 
each condition would have close to the same number of participants. 
To create the “bully” metaphor conditions, statements were inserted into the 
defense’s presentation that imply or directly state “the defendant is a victim of police 
bullying” or discrimination. Such techniques have been used successfully in past 
research regarding blatant metaphoric influence (Ottati, Graesser, & Rhoads, 1999; 
Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). The “beast” condition consisted of statements that 
allude to animalistic behaviors (e.g. preyed, pounced, fixated, grizzly). Importantly, the 
inserted metaphoric statements provided no additional evidence to the case, they were 
simply presented as opinion statements by each respective side of the case (see 
appendix). 
The content and length of the trial summaries were similar regardless of 
condition. Metaphoric statements used all had explicitly stated metaphors. Although a 
more subtle infusion of the root metaphor may be explored in future experiments, we 
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were interested if we could elicit effects with an explicitly stated metaphor (i.e. “the 
defendant is a beast!”) 
Procedure 
Participants read a trial transcript that was fairly typical for a trial regarding 
carjacking. For the sake of time, participants did not read any direct testimony or witness 
examination. Instead, jurors read the case as if it were presented by both the prosecution 
and defense attorneys. Participants read one of four trial transcripts as randomly 
generated by the survey software. One had metaphoric phrases (containing the “bully” 
metaphor) inserted into the Defense’s argument. An example of a metaphoric phrase in 
the defense’s case was “The confession was brutally coerced” which was replaced with 
“The confession was not legitimate” in the neutral conditions. The second condition had 
metaphoric phrases (containing the “beast” metaphor) inserted into the Prosecution’s 
argument. An example of a metaphoric phrase in the prosecution’s case was “This is a 
beastly crime” which was replaced with “This is a serious crime” in the neutral 
conditions. 
One control condition had the metaphoric phrases inserted into both arguments, 
and the other control condition had no metaphoric content (all neutral statements). Race 
of the defendant was randomly manipulated (50% generate African American, 50% 
generate Caucasian) within each condition. This created eight conditions in total. 
Metaphoric content and race of the defendant served as the independent variables. 
Following the case transcript, participants were asked to select a verdict that they 
felt was appropriate (Guilty/Not Guilty). They were then asked to rate on a scale of one 
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to ten how confident they felt the verdict they selected was true. The dependent variable 
of verdict (coded -1 for guilty and +1 for not guilty) multiplied by confidence rating (1- 
10) created our “likelihood of guilt” variable. This coded value multiplied by the
confidence rating created an overall “probability of guilt” variable. 
After reading the trial transcript, participants were asked to write a short narrative 
about what they believed actually happened in the scenario. This format was used to see 
whether or not subjects remembered and regenerated the metaphoric phrases. This was 
coded dichotomously; a 0 if there were no metaphoric phrases included, and a 1 if there 
was a metaphoric phrase used.  A single research assistant coded all of the narratives 
using the following guidelines: Use of words for the “victim,” “bullied,” 
“forced/coerced,” “bribed,” “target(ed),” “brutality,” “aggressive/vicious,” “bludgeoned,” 
“reckless,” or words synonymous to any of the above were coded ‘1’. Very neutral 
words, use of more hypotheticals “if” “allegedly” rather than definitive terms “stole,” 
“hit,” “confessed” “claims,” “accused,” etc., were coded ‘0’ for no metaphors used. 
Participants also were asked to rate the strength of the argument presented by the 
prosecution and the defense (see appendix). The quality scale was scored from 1-7 (with 
7 being an “extremely effective argument”). Subjects were asked to recall the race of the 
defendant from a list of several different races—this was our manipulation check to make 
sure they indeed read the survey. Those who answered incorrectly were omitted from the 
survey. Also, participants who wrote nonsensical or irrelevant stories were also omitted 
from analysis. 
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The case and specific evidence for and against the defendant were held constant 
while the presence or absence of the metaphors were manipulated. Because the current 
cultural climate in the U.S. semantically links both the “beast” and the “[victim of] bully” 
metaphors to African Americans, we expected that conditions with this metaphoric 
content would be more likely to produce verdicts which correspond with the metaphoric 
content (more guilty verdicts when the prosecution contains the “beast” metaphor and 
more ‘not guilty’ verdicts in when the defense argument contains the “[victim of] 
bullying” metaphor) when there was a black defendant as opposed to a white defendant. 
We expected to see more “guilty” verdicts in the “beast” condition overall, especially 
when the defendant was black. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
Overall, 45.9% of all participants (N=194) chose a not guilty verdict for the 
defendant in this case, while 54.1% chose a guilty verdict for the defendant regardless of 
race. The percentage of participants who used some sort of metaphoric language when 
writing their version of what happened in the case was 28.8%. The overall mean 
likelihood of guilt, which was calculated by multiplying the verdict by the level of 
confidence, across all conditions was (M=1.149, SD=6.704. This was slightly in the 
guilty direction, but was very close to zero, which would be indicative of a fairly equal 
distribution of guilt vs. not guilty ratings multiplied by confidence scores. 
A 2 (prosecutor metaphors) x 2 (defense metaphors) x 2 (defendant's race) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated on several dependent variables, including 
likelihood of guilt, verdict, quality of defense, quality of prosecution, metaphor code, and 
confidence. The results of all ANOVAs are listed in Appendix C. 
Contrary to our central hypothesis which predicted an effect of metaphoric 
language on verdict assignment and confidence in that verdict, we did not get a 
significant main effect for likelihood of guilt for the presence/absence of defense 
metaphors F= (1, 186) =2.361, p=0.126, or prosecutor metaphors F= (1, 186) =0.123, 
p=0.726. In addition, none of the higher order interactions were statistically significant. 
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We also did not find a significant main effects of prosecution metaphor presence 
on verdict judgments, F= (1, 186) =0.426, p=0.515. However, the main effect for the 
defense metaphors produced a marginally significant difference, F= (1, 186) =3.047, 
p=0.083. Overall, there were 51.5% ‘not guilty’ verdicts given for conditions that had the 
defense metaphors present, while there were 40.0% ‘not guilty’ verdicts given for 
conditions thatdid not have the defense metaphors present. Again, none of the higher 
order interactions were statistically significant. 
The results for the analyses of variance for Confidence and Quality of Prosecution 
Arguments showed no significant main effects or interactions. This suggests the 
prosecution argument was not particularly influential by itself, or perhaps jurors did not 
notice the metaphors, or they were not pervasive. 
However, in regard to ratings of the quality of defense argument, the analysis of 
variance results showed a marginally significant main effect for use of defense metaphor 
(F(1, 186) =3.792, p=0.053, and a significant 3-way interaction, F= (1, 186) =6.593, 
p=0.011. Participants rated the quality of the defense arguments higher when the bully 
metaphor was present (M=4.677, SD=1.49), as opposed to when it was absent (M=4.305, 
SD=1.488). Table 1 reports the means for the eight conditions on quality of defense 
arguments. To explore the three-way interaction, we ran t-tests comparing the presence 
vs. absence of the defense metaphor in all four of the experimental conditions defined by 
the other independent variables.  We found a significant effect for defense metaphor 
when the defendant was black and the prosecution also used their metaphor (beast), 
t(194)= -4.31, p=.000 (see table 2).  Participants saw the quality of the defense as 
Dependent Variable Overall 
Prosecutor Metaphors Defense Metaphors Defendant Race 
   Mean/SD  Mean/SD Mean/SD 
N=194 
No Beast Beast No Bully Bully Black White 
N=95 N=99 N=95 N=99 N=97 N=97 
Likelihood of  guilt 1.15/6.70 1.18/6.68 1.11/6.75 1.78/6.55 0.53/6.81 0.25/6.70 2.05/6.63 
Verdict 
Not 
Guilty=45.9%, 
Guilty=54.1% 
Not 
Guilty=44.2%, 
Guilty=55.8% 
Not 
Guilty=47.5%, 
Guilty=52.5% 
Not 
Guilty=40.0%, 
Guilty=60.0% 
Not 
Guilty=51.5%, 
Guilty=50.5% 
Not 
Guilty=50.5%, 
Guilty=49.5% 
Not 
Guilty=41.2%, 
Guilty=58.8% 
Quality  of Defense 4.50/1.50 4.43/1.50 4.55/1.49 4.30/1.48 4.67/1.49 4.41/1.50 4.58/1.50 
Quality  of 
Prosecution 
4.92/1.35 4.82/1.44 5.01/1.25 4.92/1.35 4.90/1.35 4.83/1.40 5.01/1.30 
Use of Metaphor in 
story model 
0.30/0.46 0.28/0.45 0.32/0.47 0.25/0.43 0.35/0.48 0.37/0.49 0.24/.430 
Confidence 6.50/1.95 6.49/1.88 6.50/2.02 6.50/1.86 6.49/2.03 6.40/1.90 6.61/2.00 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
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significantly higher when they used the metaphoric language. However, the effects of the 
defense metaphor failed to reach significance in any of the other three conditions (See 
appendix D for t values, etc.). 
Ratings of the Quality of Defense's  Argument 
Mean/SD 
Prosecution Metaphors No Prosecution Metaphors 
Race of Defendant Black White Black White 
Defense Metaphors 5.45/1.00 4.52/1.55 4.36/1.50 4.68/1.67 
No Defense Metaphors 3.77/1.50 4.73/1.34 4.31/1.49 4.44/1.47 
Table 2. Significant 3-way interaction means and standard deviations. 
Finally, the stories produced by the participants were coded for metaphor content 
(mentions of bully, beast, or related terms). Surprisingly, there were no significant result 
suggesting that using metaphoric language to create the stories was not influenced by the 
metaphoric content presented in the case material. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
Our criminal justice system relies on the citizen jury to fulfill the role of “triers of 
facts” (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). Thus, they should come to the same 
conclusion based on those facts regardless of how those facts are presented. However, 
there is now a fair amount of evidence that linguistic tools, such as metaphors, can 
change how people interpret other related information (Ottati, 2010).  Our main 
hypothesis was that there would be an effect of metaphoric language on juror verdicts and 
their associated level of confidence in those verdicts. However, our results failed to 
support this hypothesis, indicating that perhaps explicit metaphoric language does not 
have a strong influence on juror verdict decisions, confidence in verdict decisions or 
metaphoric recall or generation. Participants tended to choose the same verdicts 
regardless of whether the defense or the prosecution added metaphors to their case. We 
found a marginally significant difference between condiditons with and without the use 
of metaphors. This would indicate that the [victim of] “bullying” metaphor was more 
pervasive than the “beast” metaphor. This is perhaps due to the fact that this comparison 
has been discussed more frequently in the media as of lately. Jurors, at least in our sample 
population, are potentially more likely to sympathasize with the defendant and likely to 
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accept the suggestion that the defendant was ‘bullied’ by the arresting officer or the 
criminal justice system. 
Metaphoric language does appear to be important for participants’ ratings of the 
quality of defense argument, where a higher quality of defense was associated with using 
bullying metaphors, compared to when no metaphors were used. The only significant 
interaction we found occurred for ratings of the quality of defense argument. This, 
however, only occurred in instances where both the “beast” and “bully” metaphors were 
used in the case. Further, this effect only occurred when the defendant was black. We 
found this effect did not occur for white defendants. In other words, participants were not 
significantly influenced by the metaphor in a way that it altered their ratings of the white 
defendant. This was the only race effect that was observed and it was only significant for 
black defendants. We hypothesized that the use of metaphoric language would result in a 
higher probability of guilt for African American individuals, specifically when the 
"beast" metaphor is used, but the probability of guilt did not appear to be influenced by 
defendant race. Finally, there was no evidence in our results suggesting that metaphoric 
recall was influenced by whether or not there was metaphoric content. 
We based our argument of the importance of metaphoric language on previous 
research indicating that some metaphoric phrases are used so regularly that they become 
chronically accessible and have automatic activation in the mind (Ottati, Renstrom, & 
Price, 2014). So once activated, they might have the potential to influence verdicts. We 
also based our argument on the fact that race bias could influence verdict assignment, as 
23 
it has been shown in previous studies that strong racial biases do indeed exist (Bothwell 
et al. 2006). 
One reason for our finding could be the possibility that the use of metaphors does 
not have the effect we hypothesized. Previous research indicated that both defense and 
prosecution should be careful in regards to "toying" with a jury's emotions, because that 
is something that they cannot control or predict (Feigenson & Park, 2006). Similarly, not 
everyone would see the metaphors the same way. If a jury member has been bullied in 
the past, he or she might see it as a negative metaphor, evoking negative schemata. 
Evidence suggests the metaphoric phrases were not impactful when there was a 
white defendant, however, it seems they were slightly effective with a black defendant, 
but only in the evaluation of the defense’s argument when the “beast” and “bully” 
metaphor were both present. 
Perhaps, in future studies, varied levels of metaphoric language could be explored 
also, we may want to access different and perhaps varied types of metaphors. The case 
used in this research was relatively short in order to mind completion rates. We used the 
metaphors multiple times within this short story, which may have alerted participants and 
they may have attempted to counter its effects. It might be interesting to investigate more 
subtle forms of metaphor over a longer case. More realistic cases would be much longer 
and have more information to process. This could divert attention away from the 
metaphors and they may prove to be more pervasive. Previous research suggests that 
blatant use of metaphor can be rejected and compensated for. It would be interesting to 
repeat this study with subtler use of the metaphors. 
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Further, we did not find any evidence of the importance of the story model, once 
again indicating that metaphoric language might not have as strong an impact on jurors’ 
cognitive narrative (Devine, 2012) as we initially thought. Our most interesting finding 
was that the use of metaphors was associated with better quality of defense, which 
supports previous research indicating that the way language is used in court could shape 
the perception of the defense's performance. 
We did not find significant effects of race, which might indicate the jurors might 
have been aware of the potential racial bias and tried to minimize it, especially because 
the majority of study participants were white. Curiously, we found some significant 
interactions for the quality of defense and use of metaphors, but only for the white 
defendants. These results could be due to the predominantly white participant pool. 
Based on the results of this experiment, it appears the jurors still acted as triers of fact, 
but were influenced by the metaphors when asked about the strength of argument. 
APPENDIX A 
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Car Jacking Story 
Bold statements are inserted into the metaphoric conditions, italicized statements 
are inserted as equivalent neutral statements in conditions without metaphors. In 
cases where there is no italicized phrase following a bold phrase, the bold 
statement are omitted in neutral conditions. 
Prosecution: Your Honor and ladies and gentlemen of the jury; the defendant has been 
charged with the crime of Carjacking – using a firearm to steal, through force, violence, 
or intimidation, a motor vehicle. P.T. Rogers. Mr. Rogers had started his 2004 Cadillac 
Escalade in a parking garage in Murray, Kentucky, on the morning of April 6th, when 
Jack Williams approached him wearing a black hooded sweatshirt. Mr. Williams held a 
gun to Mr. Rogers head and Mr. Williams told him to step out of the vehicle. After 
complying, Jack Williams then bludgeoned Mr. Rogers with the gun. Mr. Rogers was 
then struck over the head with the gun. Jack Williams then jumped into the car and drove 
away. Mr. Rogers reported the incident. Additional evidence showed that Jack Williams 
was arrested in Ellsworth, Kansas for speeding while driving a 2004 Cadillac Escalade; 
bearing the same vehicle identification number as the one reported stolen in Murray, 
Kentucky. Jack Williams preyed upon Mr. Rogers in a time of vulnerability. This is a 
beastly crime this is a serious crime and the evidence I present is prove to you that the 
defendant is guilty as charged. 
Defense: Your Honor and ladies and gentlemen of the jury; under the law my client is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty. During this trial, you is hear no valid evidence 
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against my client implicating him in the crime of Carjacking or any crime at all. You is 
come to know the truth: that Jack Williams was driving a car that was stolen by someone 
else. After finding out that the car was stolen, Jack Williams was just trying to do the 
right thing by returning the car to its owner, whom he presumed was the girlfriend of his 
friend. He was not the perpetrator of this crime. He was simply targeted by a corrupt 
and biased system and then bullied into a confession by his arresting officer – an 
official of the same biased and corrupt system. The confession that the prosecution is 
claim incriminates my client, was not legitimate and was coerced. Therefore my client is 
not guilty. 
Prosecution: The defendant, Mr. Williams, was in the same parking garage on April 6th. 
Footage from the parking garage cameras show Mr. Williams on the first floor of the 
garage five hours before he pulled a gun on Mr. Rogers. After sizing up all of the cars in 
the parking garage, he fixated on the 2004 Cadillac Escalade. , he chose the 2004 
Cadillac Escalade. He waited until Mr. Rogers started the vehicle and then he attacked. 
Mr. Williams chose the 2004 Cadillac Escalade. Once Mr. Rogers started his vehicle, he 
saw the opportunity to threaten him. Mr. Rogers reported the incident and the car was 
marked as stolen. The next day, Williams was pulled over driving aggressively in 
Ellsworth, Kansas for speeding. After a routine check, it was learned that the car had 
been reported stolen from Murray, Kentucky. Williams was then arrested. 
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Defense: Mr. Williams was not at the parking garage on April 6th, the day the 
prosecution claims the vehicle was stolen. The surveillance footage was very blurry and 
the prosecution is assuming that Mr. Williams was at the scene. The crime occurred on 
the 5th floor of the parking garage 5 hours after Mr. Rogers was supposedly spotted at the 
garage. The perpetrator of this crime was reported to be wearing a hooded sweatshirt. 
There is no way to identify my client as the perpetrator. That surveillance tape shows a 
figure that could be anyone.  Mr. Williams first saw the vehicle when a friend of his, Mr. 
L.L. Worthy, came to his residence in Murray, Kentucky. He told Mr. Williams that the 
car belonged to his (Worthy’s) girlfriend. Worthy asked Williams to accompany him to 
Colorado so that he (Worthy) could look for a job, which Williams agreed to do. The two 
went to Colorado together. Once arriving in Colorado, Mr. Worthy asked Mr. Williams to 
take the car back to his girlfriend in Kentucky. Williams agreed to help his friend. He was 
in a hurry to get back to Kentucky to visit his sick mother, so he was driving quickly 
when he was targeted in a speed trap. He pulled over and was arrested. , so he was 
driving quickly when he was pulled over and arrested. Williams had, at this time, no 
reason to believe that the car was stolen since he assumed that the car belonged to 
Worthy’s girlfriend and that Worthy had permission to drive it. 
Prosecution: Officer Tabor, the arresting officer, identified Williams as the driver of the 
stolen Escalade and he says that Williams never mentioned anything about the car 
belonging to the girlfriend of Mr. Worthy. Mr. Rogers later identified Jack Williams 
as the grizzly man who had attacked him in the parking garage in his car on the 
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morning in question. Mr. Rogers identified Jack Williams as the man who had stolen the 
vehicle from the parking garage on the morning in question. 
Defense: Under cross-examination, Mr. Rogers, who had admitted to being very frazzled 
due to the incident could not make a positive identification of Mr. Williams being the one 
who drove the car out of the parking lot. 
Prosecution: Mr. Williams confessed to being in the parking garage on April 6th after his 
arrest. 
Defense: My client is the victim of police brutality! My client confessed due to 
pressure during the interview. The confession was brutally coerced. The confession 
was not legitimate. The police falsely claimed to have incriminating evidence and they 
promised Mr. Williams a lesser sentence if he confessed. They informed my client that 
the maximum penalty for Carjacking was life imprisonment and if he confessed he 
would at most get a year or two in jail. They told my client that confessing would be 
the best approach for mercy from the court. The police bullied Mr. Williams to 
intimidate him and force him to confess. The police said that the parking garage 
surveillance was clearly incriminating, my client had no choice but to comply with the 
authorities. The confession should be removed from the evidence. 
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Prosecution: Even if that were true, the evidence still clearly demonstrates Mr. 
Williams’s guilt. He preyed upon Mr. Rogers and took the Cadillac Escalade. 
Furthermore, a Mr. L.L. Worthy could not be located in Colorado at the address at which 
Mr. Williams claimed to have dropped him off. 
Defense: It was confirmed that there was a Mr. L.L. Worthy living in Kentucky and, 
according to phone records, him and Mr. Williams had a phone conversation on the 
morning of April 6th. Mr. Worthy could have left the address where he was dropped off. 
That is not clear evidence. 
Prosecution: True, but Mr. Worthy’s girlfriend claims that her and Mr. Worthy have 
recently split up and that she has not seen him since. Therefore, it would not make sense 
that the car is hers. 
Jury Instructions: 
To prove the crime charged against the defendant, the prosecution must prove five things 
to you: 
1) The defendant stole a motor vehicle from the owner or current occupant;
2) The vehicle was taken from the immediate presence of a person who possessed
the vehicle or was its passenger 
3) The vehicle was taken against that person's is with the use of a firearm;
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4) The defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle or to prevent that person
from resisting; 
5) When the defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle, (he/she) intended to
deprive the other person of possession of the vehicle either temporarily or 
permanently. 
If each of you believes that the prosecution proved all five of these things beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty. But if you believe the 
prosecution did not prove any one of these things beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean 
beyond all possible doubt. It means that you must consider all of the evidence and that 
you are very sure that the charge is true. 
Prosecution: The judge has told you that we must prove five things. There is absolutely 
no doubt about these 5 things. First, the defendant was arrested driving a car belonging to 
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Williams took the vehicle after Mr. Rogers started his vehicle in the 
parking garage. The car was forced away from Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rogers was assaulted by 
Mr. Williams and brutally attacked for his vehicle. Mr. Rogers was held at gunpoint 
and ruthlessly battered by Jack Williams. Mr. Rogers was threatened with a gun and 
struck over the head with the gun, so force was clearly used to take the vehicle from Mr. 
Roger’s possession. Mr. Williams clearly had malicious and predatory intent to take 
a vehicle which was not his. According to what the judge just told you, that is all we 
have to prove. Based on the evidence, you must find the defendant guilty. 
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Defense: Mr. Williams was unlucky to get into a car with a man who had stolen that car. 
He got into the car because he had agreed to help his friend find a job in Colorado. If he 
had knowingly gotten into a stolen vehicle, this would be a different case. Mr. William’s 
confession was not legitimate and should not be considered in your deliberation. This 
man is a victim of bullying in interrogation by corrupt police officers. Remember 
that under the law my client is presumed to be innocent. The prosecution must prove 
every part of its case beyond a reasonable doubt – that means that you must be very sure 
that there is no possible circumstance beyond what the prosecution is describing. Mr. 
Williams is a victim of a corrupted criminal justice system. Mr. Williams is not the 
perpetrator in this case. One of the things they must prove is that my client is the one 
who drove the car out of the parking garage. The prosecution has presented no real 
evidence to you to show that this is true. That means that there is a reasonable doubt and, 
therefore, you must find Mr. Williams not guilty. 
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Q1. Please describe what you think happened in the case outlined on the previous page. 
Please include important facts and description of the defendant. 
Q2. Please indicate which verdict you would choose for the defendant. 
❏ Guilty (1)
❏ Not Guilty (2)
Q3. How confident are you that your verdict decision is true? 
Q4. Please indicate how difficult you felt it was to make your verdict decision. 
Very Difficult Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Easy Very 
Not 
Confide
n t (1) 
2 
(2) 
3 
(3) 
4 
(4) 
Moderate
l y      
Confiden
t (5) 
6 
(6) 
7 
(7) 
8 
(8) 
9 
(9) 
Very 
Confide
n t (10) 
Confiden
c e (1) 
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 
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Difficult 
(1) 
(2) Difficult 
(3) 
(4) Easy (5) (6) Easy 
(7) 
Difficulty 
(1) 
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 
Q5. Please rate your overall assessment of the Prosecution's case. 
Very 
Ineffectiv
e (1) 
Ineffective 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Ineffective 
(3) 
Neither 
Effective 
nor 
Ineffective 
(4) 
Somewhat       
Effective 
(5) 
Effective 
(6) 
Very 
Effective 
(7) 
Quality 
(1) ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
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Q6. Please rate your overall assessment of the Defense's case. 
Very 
Ineffecti
ve (1) 
Ineffecti
ve (2) 
Somewh
at 
Ineffecti
ve (3) 
Neither 
Effectiv
e nor 
Ineffecti
ve (4) 
Somewh
at       
Effectiv
e (5) 
Effecti
ve 
(6) 
Very 
Effecti
ve (7) 
Quali
ty 
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 
Q7. What was the race of the Defendant? 
❏ Caucasian (1)
❏ African American (2)
❏ Hispanic (3)
❏ Asian (4)
❏ Indian (5)
❏ Multiple/Mixed Race (6)
Q8. Please indicate your sex. 
❏ Male (1)
❏ Female (2)
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Q9. Please indicate your age. 
Q10. Please indicate your race. 
❏ Caucasian (1)
❏ African American (2)
❏ Hispanic (3)
❏ Asian (4)
❏ Indian (5)
❏ Multiple/Mixed Race (6)
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: liklihoodGuilt 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 418.222a 7 59.746 1.346 .231 
Intercept 228.420 1 228.420 5.146 .024 
ProsecutionMetaphors 5.472 1 5.472 .123 .726 
DefenseMetaphors 104.785 1 104.785 2.361 .126 
DefendantRaceCondition 164.654 1 164.654 3.709 .056 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors 13.950 1 13.950 .314 .576 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 112.818 1 112.818 2.542 .113 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 54.093 1 54.093 1.219 .271 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
.967 1 .967 .022 .883 
Error 8256.443 186 44.389 
Total 8931.000 194 
Corrected Total 8674.665 193 
a. R Squared = .048 (Adjusted R Squared = .012)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: QualityDefense 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 35.261a 7 5.037 2.347 .026 
Intercept 3881.548 1 3881.548 1808.383 .000 
ProsecutionMetaphors 1.303 1 1.303 .607 .437 
DefenseMetaphors 8.140 1 8.140 3.792 .053 
DefendantRaceCondition .664 1 .664 .310 .579 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors 4.827 1 4.827 2.249 .135 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition .536 1 .536 .250 .618 
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DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 7.505 1 7.505 3.496 .063 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
14.151 1 14.151 6.593 .011 
Error 399.234 186 2.146 
Total 4354.000 194 
Corrected Total 434.495 193 
a. R Squared = .081 (Adjusted R Squared = .047)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Metaphor Code 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1.869a 7 .267 1.267 .269 
Intercept 17.532 1 17.532 83.213 .000 
ProsecutionMetaphors .097 1 .097 .461 .498 
DefenseMetaphors .479 1 .479 2.274 .133 
DefendantRaceCondition .796 1 .796 3.778 .053 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors .199 1 .199 .947 .332 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition .069 1 .069 .328 .567 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition .032 1 .032 .151 .698 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
.092 1 .092 .436 .510 
Error 39.188 186 .211 
Total 59.000 194 
Corrected Total 41.057 193 
a. R Squared = .046 (Adjusted R Squared = .010)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Verdict 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
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Corrected Model 7.738a 7 1.105 1.112 .357 
Intercept 1.261 1 1.261 1.268 .262 
ProsecutionMetaphors 
.424 1 .424 .426 .515 
DefenseMetaphors 3.030 1 3.030 3.047 .083 
DefendantRaceCondition 
2.000 1 2.000 2.012 .158 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors .665 1 .665 .668 .415 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
1.633 1 1.633 1.643 .202 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
.910 1 .910 .915 .340 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
.054 1 .054 .054 .816 
Error 184.942 186 .994 
Total 194.000 194 
Corrected Total 192.680 193 
a. R Squared = .040 (Adjusted R Squared = .004)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: QualityProsecution 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 8.704a 7 1.243 .672 .695 
Intercept 4580.576 1 4580.576 2476.875 .000 
ProsecutionMetaphors 
1.081 1 1.081 .585 .445 
DefenseMetaphors .010 1 .010 .005 .943 
DefendantRaceCondition 
2.030 1 2.030 1.098 .296 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors 3.011 1 3.011 1.628 .204 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
.134 1 .134 .072 .788 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
1.927 1 1.927 1.042 .309 
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ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
.802 1 .802 .434 .511 
Error 343.977 186 1.849 
Total 5044.000 194 
Corrected Total 352.680 193 
a. R Squared = .025 (Adjusted R Squared = -.012)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Confidence 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 22.328a 7 3.190 .833 .561 
Intercept 8018.343 1 8018.343 2094.174 .000 
ProsecutionMetaphors 
.141 1 .141 .037 .848 
DefenseMetaphors .057 1 .057 .015 .903 
DefendantRaceCondition 
1.198 1 1.198 .313 .577 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors 8.843 1 8.843 2.310 .130 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
5.665 1 5.665 1.480 .225 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
4.486 1 4.486 1.172 .280 
ProsecutionMetaphors * 
DefenseMetaphors * 
DefendantRaceCondition 
.296 1 .296 .077 .781 
Error 712.172 186 3.829 
Total 8931.000 194 
Corrected Total 734.500 193 
a. R Squared = .030 (Adjusted R Squared = -.006)
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T-Test
Group Statistics 
DefenseMetaphors N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error Mean 
QualityDefense nobullymetaphors 
bullymetaphor 
26 
20 
3.769 
5.450 
1.5049 
.9987 
.2951 
.2233 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
For Equality
t-test for Equality
F Sig t d
Mean 
Diff-
erence
Std 
Error of 
Diff 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval
Lower
QualityDefense Equal Variances 
Assumed 3.837 .056 -4.312 44.00 .000 
-1 680 .3898 
-
2.4
- 
.8952
Equal variances 
not assumed -4.541 43.192 .000 -1 680 .3701 
-2.4 - .9345
*/Whitedefendant 
T-Test
Group Statistics 
ProsecutionMetaphor N Mean
Std
. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean 
Quality Defense
nobeastmetioned
 
beastmetaphor
19 
31 
4.684
4.510
1.6681
1.5464
.3828
.2777
Independent Samples Test 
QualityDefense
Equal variances assumed .000 .985 .362 48.00 .1681 .4642 
- 
.7653 1.114
Equal variances 
not assumed .355 35.963 .724 .1681 .4729 
- 
.7911 1.127 
Upper
Sig 
(2-
Tail)
Levene's Test 
For Equality
t-test for Equality
F Sig t d
Mean 
Diff-
erence
Std 
Error of 
Diff 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval
Lower Upper
Sig 
(2-
Tail)
.719
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